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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the current Philippine counterinsurgency strategy in 
relation to the Philippine government past experiences of fighting insurgency 
nationwide. The Philippine government recognizes insurgency as a national 
threat that hampers sustained peace and development in the country, but 
government efforts in counterinsurgency have been less than successful.  
The thesis examines four historical case studies: the "All Out Friendship or 
All Out Force" program of President Ramon Magsaysay against the Huk 
Rebellion in 1950s; “Oplan Katatagan” during the Martial Law Era under 
President Ferdinand E. Marcos; “Lambat-Bitag Campaign” during the 
administrations of Presidents Corazon Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos; and 
“Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines” in the current administration of 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The thesis demonstrates that successful 
counterinsurgency operations require a collaborative interagency approach 
based on a clear and logical national strategy. This strategy cannot succeed at 
the national level only. The strategy must be pushed down to the local level 
where effective change can occur. Despite current perceptions, 
counterinsurgency operations are not the exclusive domain of the military. In fact, 
the possibility of success is often diminished when the military takes a dominant 
role in counterinsurgency operations. Finally, the thesis recommends that the 
Philippine government should internalize and adopt the “correct attitude” that has 
been missing in most of the early counterinsurgency efforts. Although focused on 
the Philippines, lessons from this thesis can be applied elsewhere. 
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A. BACKGROUND  
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), particularly its 
security forces, has been fighting the same type of insurgents for more than three 
decades. The Local Communist Movement (LCM) and the Southern Philippines 
Secessionist Movements have been considered two of the world’s longest 
existing insurgencies.1 Several thousand lives have been lost on both sides, 
including a number of innocent civilians. Despite the costs, the insurgency 
continues to exist. It has long been recognized that the root causes of insurgent 
movements are multidimensional, encompassing both political and socio-
economic dimensions.2 The insurgents’ use of violent activities poses a serious 
threat to the Republic of the Philippines’ (RP) national security, and hampers the 
pursuit of sustained peace and development in the country.  
Recognizing this problem of insurgency, the GRP developed the National 
Internal Security Plan (NISP)3 in 2001. The NISP, which promotes the “left hand 
and right hand approach,”4 is the government’s holistic5 response against any 
form of insurgency. This plan can be considered a holistic approach because it 
involves four major components that provide sufficient tools to address the 
insurgencies. These components are peace and order/security, 
                                            
1 “Philippine Human Development Report 2005,” Peace, Human Security and Human Development in 
the Philippines 2nd Edition, Published  by the Human Development Network (HDN) in cooperation with the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and New Zealand Agency for International Development 
(NZAID); available from http://hdr.undp.org/docs/reports/national/PHI_Philippines/Philippines_2005_en.pdf/; 
accessed 26 Jan 2007. In this report the SPSGs are also referred to as the Moro Insurgencies. 
2 RP Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, Philippine National Internal Security Plan 
(NISP), Malacanang, Manila, 2005, 8. 
3 This document was promulgated under the Executive Order No.21 signed by the President on 19 Jun 
2001, adopting the Strategy of Holistic Approach as the government response to situations of instability and 
insurgency. 
4 Also categorically called the “fight and develop strategy” which is basically a combination of 
military/police operations and socio-economic development to address the root causes of insurgencies. See 
Chapter IV for more details.  
5 I use the term “holistic” to mean ‘all encompassing.” 
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political/legal/diplomatic response, socio-economic/psychosocial development, 
and informational dissemination.6 This plan basically taps all government 
agencies – military and civilian, including diplomatic offices – to promote good 
governance and public confidence in the government, to alleviate poverty, and to 
provide the people with a secure environment, one that is conducive to 
development.  
However, this holistic approach might be considered “more easily said 
than done” because it is rarely implemented at the ground level where armed 
insurgents have the greatest influence. In most areas of the country, the 
necessary coordination and collaboration between and among different 
government agencies and stakeholders are lacking.  Often, people at the ground 
level perceive that the military forces are the only lead agency addressing the 
problem of insurgency. In places where a visible military presence is not an 
option, people reason that they must cooperate with the insurgents out of fear, 
since there are no local military forces to protect them.7 Following this line of 
thinking from the people on the ground, it would seem that there is no other 
component of the government that can address the insurgency problem other 
than the military.  
In this thesis, the author will demonstrate how the Philippines' lead 
government agencies have carried out their assigned tasks in pursuit of the 
government’s counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. By exploring the current 
Philippine COIN strategy and comparing it to the country’s historical COIN 
campaigns, the author will identify gaps or shortfalls that inhibit the GRP from 
achieving successful COIN efforts.  
                                            
6 Operation Center - Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, Primer on National Internal 
Security Plan (NISP), Department of National Defense, Quezon City, Philippines. 
7 Fr. Jovic E. Lobrigo, Sonia Imperial, and Noel Rafer, “Case Study on the Human Development and 
Economic Costs/Spillovers of Armed Conflict in Bicol” (A background paper submitted to the Human 
Development Network Foundation, Inc. for the Philippine Human Development Report 2005), 39-41. 
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B. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
The Philippines, as an important partner with the United States in the 
Global War on Terror, has been a testing ground for effective COIN strategies. 
The U.S. considers the extensive operations carried out in Basilan province, 
located in the southern part of the Philippines, as a success story for COIN 
campaigns.8 As a result of the Balikatan ("Shoulder to Shoulder") exercises, in 
which thousands of U.S. personnel participated alongside their Philippine 
counterparts, the U.S. believes that the GRP has successfully addressed the 
problem about armed insurgents (specifically the Abu Sayyaf Group). More 
importantly, these efforts have also addressed the root causes of insurgency in 
that area. The GRP, with the assistance of the U.S. and various non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), has invested heavily in education, local 
economies, public works, and social welfare programs, in order to wean the 
population away from the insurgents. This same strategy is currently being 
carried out in Sulu province, also in the southern Philippines.9  
However, this “left hand and right hand approach” to COIN as applied in 
Basilan is not new to the Philippine government and its armed forces. The same 
strategy has already been implemented several times in the past and, despite its 
proven effectiveness, the strategy has never been sustained. Hence, the problem 
of insurgency continues to exist. It is the argument of this thesis that despite the 
current success of the “left hand and right hand approach” in the southern 
Philippines, which is largely credited to the influence of the U.S., the GRP lacks 
an efficient push to implement the strategy for the greater part of the country 
which in effect sustained both the insurgents and their raison d’etre.  
                                            
8 David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, “Winning in the Pacific: The Special Operations Forces 
Indirect Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) Forum, Issue 44, (1st Quarter 2007), 26-27. 
9 Paul Wiseman, “In Philippines, U.S. Making Progress In War On Terror,” USA Today, (14 Feb 2007), 
10. 
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C. THESIS METHODOLOGY 
Using the “three-legged stool” model of Arthur F. Lykke as the framework 
for analysis and the writings of scholars, researchers, critics, and policy-makers, 
the thesis reviews four selected historical cases of Philippine COIN campaigns in 
order to identify the factors that led to success and failures of these campaigns. 
These four cases are the "All Out Friendship or All Out Force" program of 
President Ramon Magsaysay against the Huk Rebellion in 1950s, “Oplan 
Katatagan” during the Martial Law Era under President Ferdinand E. Marcos, 
“Lambat-Bitag Campaign” during the administrations of Presidents Corazon 
Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos, and “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines” 
(OEF-P) in the current administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. 
These case studies are selected for having the same concept of national strategy 
but they differ in the implementation aspect at the local level. All these four 
campaigns have recognized that the problem of Philippine insurgency is deeply 
rooted in poverty, ignorance, disease, and injustice. However, they did not 
acquire the same outcome after implementation. Magsaysay’s program stands 
out to be the best illustration of a successful Philippine COIN strategy for his 
vision has been implemented from the national down to local levels because of 
his administration’s good leadership and close supervision. Marcos’ campaign 
failed because his administration lacked the dedication and reliability in the eyes 
of the Filipino people. The “Lambat-Bitag Campaign” in general also failed 
because the initial success gained by the military was not sustained by the 
government’s civilian agencies due to bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of 
appreciation of the campaign. Lastly, OEF-P succeed in its COIN campaign but 
the primary enabler to its success remains a question because of the U.S. 
pressure and oversight monitoring down to the local level. 
By searching the means or the resources used by different Philippine 
government administrations in implementing their COIN operations, the ways or 
concepts applied on how they tried to achieve their objectives, and the ends or 
objectives that engulfed the overall conduct of their operations, the author finds 
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the “missing link” that can bridge the gap to have a successful Philippine COIN 
strategy. The Philippine government administrators and implementors must have 
the “correct attitude” which implies sincerity, integrity, and dedication to public 
service despite taking risks and making self sacrifices for the good of the people. 
This kind of attitude connotes readiness to go beyond “class and time” to check 
how policies and projects are implemented on the ground. The administrators 
must have uprightness to impose appropriate sanctions or punishments instead 
of coddling the “crooks” in the government.  
The author organizes this thesis in such a way that readers will have a 
clear background about the primary insurgent organizations being confronted by 
the GRP. Likewise, they will have the capacity to analyze and compare the 
different COIN campaigns that were implemented in the past and relate them 
with the current COIN strategy of the Philippine government. Chapter II focuses 
on the major insurgent organizations confronting the GRP, such as the Local 
Communist Movement (LCM) and the Southern Philippines Secessionist Groups 
(SPSGs). This chapter reviews the different insurgents’ organizational strategies, 
resources, and current status necessary to evaluate their commonality and 
grievances that keep them active for several decades now. Chapter III reviews 
and analyzes the Philippine government's current national security strategy, the 
NISP, to overcome insurgency movements nationwide and to address the root 
causes of this problem. This chapter also identifies the lead government 
agencies that are tasked by the government with working for the components of 
the NISP’s strategy of holistic approach (SHA). The author uses the theory of 
systems dynamic in order to analyze the social dynamics of this multifaceted 
COIN strategy in relation to actual situations on the ground. Chapter IV reviews 
and analyzes the four different case studies of COIN operations in the Philippines 
as earlier mentioned. In addition, the above cited chapters demonstrate how the 
GRP has responded over time against the insurgents. This study reveals that the 
concept of GRP COIN strategy over time remains the same but they differ in the 
implementation aspects depending on the focus of the government 
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administration at its particular period of governance. Government administrators 
and implementors are found to have great influence to make COIN strategy 
works effectively or not.  
Chapter V encompasses the comparison of the analyses between the 
case studies and the current GRP COIN strategy. The author tries to depict in 
this chapter the insurgents’ behavior over time as they fight the different 
government administrations that come along their way. It also demonstrates how 
the insurgents exploit the opportunities whenever they find weakness in the 
government administration. Chapter VI concludes the thesis by identifying the 
“missing link” that prevents the GRP from attaining complete success in its COIN 
efforts.  
This thesis finds that the Philippines has a successful COIN strategy 
documented in the past efforts. Other strategy that adopts the same concept of 
“left hand and right hand approach” unfortunately fails because of the GRP’s 
inability to sustain the initial success. This gap or “missing link” is due in part to 
lack of “correct attitude,” as defined earlier, of government administrators and 
implementors. At the end of this thesis, the author proposes solutions how to 
resolve the “missing link” in order to achieve a successful Philippine COIN 
strategy. 
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II. PHILIPPINE INSURGENTS 
The most complex problem in the Philippines conflict is the array of 
insurgent groups representing the Local Communist Movement (LCM) and the 
Southern Philippines Secessionist Groups (SPSGs), which are considered to be 
two of the longest-running insurgencies in the world.10 As a result of these major 
ideological struggles, the government is confronted with three major threats: the 
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic 
Front (CPP/NPA/NDF), identified with the LCM, and the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which fall under the category of 
the SPSGs.11 These insurgencies continue to pose serious threats to the 
Philippines’ national security and their violent activities hamper the pursuit of 
sustained peace and development in the country.12   
A. THE LOCAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT (LCM)  
It is widely known that the Communist insurgency in the Philippines is a 
deeply rooted and multi-faceted problem. It includes political, economic, 
psychosocial, and security issues as part of its complaints against the existing 
government.  The LCM, spearheaded by the CPP/NPA/NDF, has long worked to 
arouse discontent among the local people by exploiting the issues of poverty, 
ignorance, disease and injustice. The LCM mobilizes these people, particularly 
peasants and workers, by agitating around the issues of U.S. imperialism, semi-
colonialism, and semi-feudalism in Philippine society. In this way, they cause 
disillusionment and create a sense of helplessness and hopelessness among the 
people.13 The forerunner of this Communist movement is the Huk insurgency, 
                                            
10 “Philippine Human Development Report 2005,” 2-3. In this report the SPSGs are also referred to as 
the Moro Insurgencies. 
11 Philippine National Internal Security Plan (NISP), 2-4. 
12 Ibid, 1. 
13 Jose Maria Sison (Joma) aka Amado Guerrero, “Author’s Introduction,” Philippine Society and 
Revolution, (30 Jul 1970); available from http://www.philippinerevolution.net/cgi-
bin/cpp/pdocs.pl?id=lrp_e;page=03/; accessed 26 Jan 2007.  
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which was defeated by Ramon Magsaysay’s administration in the 1950’s.14 Both 
insurgent movements emerged out of the tensions between the “haves” and the 
“have-nots” where the problems of tenancy, poverty, demography and frustration 
with the government have long been the basic material used to incite their 
revolt.15 To date, the CPP/NPA/NDF continues to be the principal threat to 
Philippine national security.16   
The Local Communist Movement (LCM) has split into two main factions, 
the Reaffirmists who favor Jose Maria Sison’s Maoist strategy of waging 
revolution in the countryside and the Rejectionists who favor the insurrection in 
the cities similar to the strategy of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.17 Jose Maria 
Sison is the overall leader of the CPP/NPA/NDF since 1987.18 Nevertheless, 
these factions share the common objective of seizing political power in order to 
eventually replace the country’s democratic form of government with Communist 
rule.19 Of these two factions, the Reaffirmists are the primary concern of the 
government because they are far stronger in terms of manpower, firearms and 
the extent of their influence in driving a wedge between the government and the 
people.20 The ultimate objective of the CPP/NPA/NDF remains unaltered; that is, 
to use violence to supplant the country's democratic government with Communist 
                                            
14 David Joel Steinberg, "The Marcos Era," The  Philippines:  A Singular and Plural Place, Second 
Edition, Revised and Updated, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., 1990), Chapter 7, 123. 
15 Ibid, 123-124. 
16 This was the result of the review of AFP Internal Security Operations Plan codenamed BANTAY- 
LAYA conducted by the General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philiippines at the AFP Command and 
General Staff College, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City from 14 to 17 December 2004.  
17 The quarrel between Reaffirmists and Rejectionists factions is over strategy. To that end, the 
Rejectionists have, since 1992, concentrated on politicizing the urban squatters and industrial proletariat in 
preparation for their anticipated urban insurrection. However, they are still temporarily united in fight against 
the Arroyo administration.  
18 He is also known as Joma, Armando Liwanag, and Amado Guerrero. He is currently in self-exile in 
Utrecht, the Netherlands.  
19 Philippine National Internal Security Plan (NISP), 2. 
20 Armed Forces of the Philippines Intelligence Estimate for 2006. 
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rule, with aims to restructure society along the socialist model.21 The party still 
adheres to the Maoist principle of "National Democratic Revolution," with the goal 
of overthrowing the government and restructuring Philippine society according to 
socialist model of a "People's Democratic Government."22 The party's general 
policies are against foreign monopoly capitalism, domestic feudalism, and 
bureaucratic capitalism. The CPP/NPA, together with Jose Maria Sison, has 
been identified by the U.S. Department of State and the European Union as an 
international terrorist organization.23  
1. Organization and Leadership 
The organizational structure of the CPP/NPA/NDF is based on democratic 
centralism24, which includes both centralized leadership and decentralized 
operations. This structure is a commission type of organization, consisting of the 
party delegates from different regions who make up its National Congress, or 
Central Committee, as its highest governing body. This Central Committee (CC) 
directs and supervises the activities of the functional staffs and the Regional 
Committees (RCs). In turn, the RCs supervise the activities of the provincial, 
front, section and sub-section committees. Lastly, the party branches established 
in the barangays (villages), poor urban communities, and factories form the basic 
units of the organization. The CPP, founded on 26 December 1968, provides 
political leadership to the movement and determines the general line and 
direction of the revolution. The NPA, organized on 29 March 1969, serves as the 
military arm of the party and carries out armed struggle through the Maoist 
concept of People’s Protracted War. The NDF, established on 24 April 1973, 
                                            
21 Armando Liwanag, “Win the Armed Revolution in the 21st Century,” Ang Bayan, Special Issue, (29 
Mar 2000), 1-2.  Message during the 31st Anniversary of the New People’s Army; available from 
http://www.philippinerevolution.net/; accessed 02 Nov 2006.   
22 “Knowing the Enemy: Are We Missing the Point?” Armed Forces of the Philippines, (29 Sep 2004). 
23 Center for Defense Information, “Terrorism Project: List of Known Terrorist Organizations;” available 
from http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist-groups.cfm/; accessed on 14 Feb 2006. 
24 Central Committee, “Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Carry the Revolution Forward,” 23rd 
Anniversary of the Communist Party of the Philippines, (26 Dec 1991), 1; available from 
http://www.philippinerevolution.net/cgi-bin//cpp/pdocs.pl?id=reafe:page=01/; accessed 26 Jan 2007.   
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provides umbrella organizations to shield the CPP/NPA through united front 
building, solicitation of international support, and recognition from other 
Communist organizations abroad. Jose Maria Sison, despite in the Netherlands, 
provides guidance to the organization through modern communication facilities.25 
2. Strength and Disposition 
In 2005, the strength of the CPP/NPA was estimated at 9,860 party 
members and armed regulars with approximately 5,980 firearms available to 
carry out political and military oerations. However, it is also known to be able to 
mobilize some 121,660 additional combat and support elements including 
members of its people’s militias, self-defense units, mass activists and reliable 
contacts in rural and urban areas nationwide.26  In addition, the Communist Party 
has 613,230 mass base elements in rural areas, although its supporters and 
sympathizers in urban areas cannot be readily quantified.27 The CPP/NPA claims 
to have established 128 guerrilla fronts which effectively cover a vast area of the 
country; in contrast, the GRP, through its armed forces and police forces, has 
identified only 107 guerrilla fronts.28 
3. Strategy 
The CPP/NPA/NDF adheres to a combined strategy of armed and legal 
struggles to fight the Philippine government. The party exploits and integrates all 
available resources; however, it largely relies on the support of the masses to 
move forward with its struggles in all aspects – military, political, ideological, 
economic, and cultural. 
                                            





a. Armed Struggle 
The CPP/NPA/NDF still maintains the Maoist principle of a 
Protracted People's War (PPW) which calls for the encircling of cities from the 
countryside through armed struggle, as its primary strategy.29 This strategy is 
carried out by creating stable guerilla bases in the countryside, from where the 
revolutionary struggle can advance towards urban centers. The CPP/NPA 
observes three strategic stages: a strategic defensive stage, a strategic 
stalemate stage, and a strategic offensive stage. At the strategic defensive stage, 
the NPA is militarily weaker than government forces; at the strategic stalemate 
stage, the NPA has achieved a degree of parity with the government forces. 
Finally, at the strategic offensive stage, the NPA has reached relative superiority 
over the government forces and becomes capable of conducting large-scale 
armed offensives against government forces in major cities in order to facilitate 
the final takeover of political power.30 
As instigated by factions within the organization of the LCM and as 
a result of the GRP’s counterinsurgency efforts through the “Lambat-Bitag 
Campaign,”31 the Communist insurgents’ suffered a great decline in strength. 
This brought the Communist Party to implement a rectification program in 1992 
with the goal of reiterating the ideological and political lines of the party and 
intensifying recruitment and organizational expansion to recover its lost 
grounds.32 At present, the armed struggle is still at the strategic defensive stage; 
                                            
29 Message of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines to the Party Cadres, 
Red Commanders, and Fighters of the New People’s Army, “Fight to Hasten the Ouster of Arroyo and 
Strengthen the Revolutionary Movement,” Ang Bayan, (29 Mar 2006); available from 
http://www.philippinerevolution.net/cgi-bin/ab/text.pl?issue=20060329;lang=eng;article=01/; accessed 26 
Jan 2007. 
30 Victor N.Corpus, “CPP/NPA Strategies for the War as a Whole,” Silent War, (Quezon City, 
Philippines: VNC Enterprises, 1989), 25-57. 
31 Roy T. Devesa, "An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology," 
Thesis, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College, 2005), 35-36. The insurgents’ 
strength was reduced from 25,000 in 1987 to 5,000 in 1994.  
32 “Intensify the Armed Struggle!” Ang Bayan, (Editorial, 21 Mar 2006), Vol. XXXVII, No. 6; available 
from http://www.philippinerevolution.net/cgi-bin/ab/text.pl?issue=20060321;lang=eng;article=01; accessed 
01 Feb 2007. 
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the CPP/NPA is striving to build enough strength to win larger battles and 
campaigns, in order to move to the next stage of the People's War.33  The Party 
is trying to achieve this by conducting small-scale and limited tactical offensives 
while at the same time aggressively undertaking mass organizing work, 
establishing guerrilla fronts, and training its own militia in the countryside. In 
addition, the CPP/NPA engages in both selective and indiscriminate terrorist 
acts, such as kidnapping for ransom, murder, assassination, bombing, arson, 
and extortion in order to bleed and weaken government security forces.34 
b. Legal Struggle 
  The legal struggle is another form of strategy that the Party uses in 
its search for a national democratic revolution aimed at toppling the existing 
government in favor for its People's Democratic Government. This struggle puts 
special emphasis on united front-building and mass movements so as to isolate 
the government forces both politically and psychologically.35 This strategy 
requires that the Party operates within the legal framework in order to facilitate 
the infiltration of legitimate organizations within the labor/peasants, women, 
student/youth, children, cultural activists, and urban poor sectors. The Party 
agitates these organizations to participate in CPP/NPA/NDF-initiated rallies, 
demonstrations, and other forms of protest.36  This approach includes the 
infiltration and organization of the masses in different barangays, or villages, 
nationwide through a step-by-step process which includes the establishment of 
initial contacts, organizing groups and committees, forming solid mass 
                                            
33 “Intensify the Armed Struggle!” 
34 Ricardo C. Morales, "Perpetual Wars: The Philippine Insurgencies," Thesis, (Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2003), 24. Morales’ work cites this statement by Rodolfo Salas, originally published in 
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 Feb 2003. 
35 Jose Maria Sison, “Solving Some Problems in the Broad United Front and Mass Movement to Oust 
the Arroyo Regime,” Ang Bayan, (21 Mar 2006); available from http://www.philippinerevolution.net/cgi-
bin/ab/text.pl?issue=20060312;lang=eng;article=01/; accessed 01 Feb 2007. 
36 Message of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines, “Further Strengthen 
the Communist Party of the Philippines to Lead the People’s Democratic Revolution,” Ang Bayan, (26 Dec 
2006); available from http://www.philippinerevolution.net/cgi-
bin/ab/text.pl?issue=20061226;lang=eng;article=01/; accessed 01 Feb 2007. 
 13
associations, and establishing party branches, peoples' militia and Barangay 
Revolutionary Committees. Once a Barangay Revolutionary Committee (BRC) 
has been established, it indicates the existence of CPP/NPA shadow 
government, or the Party’s so called People's Democratic Government in the 
locality. It is then easy for the CPP/NPA/NDF to incite peasants to rise up against 
the authority of their landlords, by combining armed struggle with an agrarian 
revolution program.  
  In addition to united front-building and mass movements, the 
Party’s legal struggle includes participation in elections, peace negotiations, and 
acts of international solidarity. As a result of the implementation of the National 
Program for Unification and Development (NPUD), which offers amnesty to 
Communist insurgents, Muslim separatists, and coup plotters, and of the repeal 
of the Republic Act 1700 (also known as the Anti-Subversion Law) during the 
administration of President Fidel V. Ramos,37 the Communist party began 
fielding candidates for both national and local elections as a means of influencing 
the Government’s policy-making process. Through participation in these 
elections, the CPP/NPA/NDF is able to infiltrate the government bureaucracy, to 
facilitate the diversion of government funds in furtherance of Party objectives,38 
to intensify extortion operations from other candidates in exchange for permits to 
campaign in CPP/NPA influenced areas, and to conduct propaganda against the 
Government.39 The Communist Party also views the conduct of peace 
negotiations as an important aspect of its legal struggle, because this process 
can be used as a venue for airing the party’s demands. The Party exploits 
negotiations to its strategic advantage by making impossible and unreasonable 
demands, using negotiations as part of propaganda campaigns, and eventually 
                                            
37 Carolina G. Hernandez, "Institutional Response to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces of the 
Philippines," Philippine Human Development Report 2005, (A Background Paper Submitted to the Human 
Development Foundation, Inc.), 13. 
38 Joel Guinto, “Bayan Muna Win Like Having Communist Rebel in Congress,” Inquirer.Net, (05 Apr 
2007); available from http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/topstories/topstories/view_article.php?article_id=58986/; 
accessed 06 Apr 2007. 
39 Armed Forces of the Philippines Intelligence Estimate for 2006. 
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blaming the government for any subsequent collapse of negotiations.  Lastly, in 
2001 the Communist Party created the International League of People’s Struggle 
(ILPS) under the chairmanship of Jose Maria Sison as a means of taking 
advantage of foreign networks to carry out its acts of international solidarity. The 
ILPS is utilized by the CPP/NPA/NDF as a means of mobilizing its alliances 
abroad in order to gain sympathy and support from the international 
community.40  
B. THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT 
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a breakaway faction of the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that was created in late 1977.41 The MILF 
was formally founded in 1984 by Hashim Salamat, who was then the MNLF Vice-
Chairman,42 due to differences in objectives, as well as charges of corruption 
and abuse of power against the MNLF Leadership.43 Currently, the MILF is the 
largest Muslim insurgent group representing the Southern Philippines 
Secessionist Groups (SPSGs). Its goal is to establish an independent Islamic 
State in Mindanao through a four-point program of action: military offensives 
intensified diplomatic offensives, sustained mass actions, and negotiation with 
the government.44 It is largely confined to Central Mindanao, particularly to the 
provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, and North Cotabato. 
To finance its secessionist goals, the MILF carries out kidnap-for-ransom and 
extortion. It also solicits financial support from local supporters and international 
                                            
40 Armed Forces of the Philippines Intelligence Estimate for 2006. 
41 International Crisis Group, “Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,” 
ICG Asia Report, (13 Jul 2004), 4-5; available from 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/080_southern_philippines_backgrounder
_terrorism_n_peace_process.pdf/; accessed 11 May 2006. 
42 Soliman M. Santos, Jr.,”Evolution of the Armed Conflict on the Moro Front,” A Background Paper 
Submitted to the Human Development Network Foundation, Inc. for the Philippine Human Development 
Report 2005, 4. 
43 Daniel Joseph Ringuet, “The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in Mindanao,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, Issue 1, April 2002, 41. 
44 Philippine National Internal Security Plan (NISP), 3-4. 
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Islamic organizations.45 In the pursuit of its goals, the MILF’s military arm, the 
Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), carries out semi-conventional and 
conventional warfare against GRP forces.  
The Philippine government has requested that the MILF not be included in 
the list of foreign terrorist organizations, so as not to undermine the ongoing truce 
between the two sides.46 Under this truce, an International Monitoring Team, 
composed of Malaysian, Libyan, and Brunei delegations, has been monitoring 
the peace agreement, since October 2004, in order to ensure its success.47 The 
cease-fire agreement between the GRP and the MILF resulted in a substantial 
reduction of violence and armed clashes. The International Monitoring Team also 
warned the MILF leadership to end its ties with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and 
the Jemaah-Islamiyah (JI). Once this peace initiative succeeds, it will deprive the 
ASG and JI of their base of operations, making it difficult for them to establish a 
foothold in the Philippines, especially in Mindanao. 
1. Organization and Leadership 
Hashim Salamat died in 2003; he was replaced as head of the MILF by 
Ahod Ibrahim (also known as Al Haj Murad Ebrahim), who, like Salamat, came 
from the secular elite. Murad, the former MILF Chief of Staff,48 is a pragmatic and 
flexible long-time military leader who believes in resolving the conflict through a 
peaceful means.49 The MILF organizational structure is patterned after the 
                                            
45 Armed Forces of the Philippines Intelligence Estimate for 2006. 
46 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Radical Muslim Terrorism in the Philippines,” Forthcoming in Andrew Tan (ed), 
Handbook on Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia, (London: Edward Elgar Publishing, Limited, 
2006), 8; available from http://www.kaf.ph/pdfdb//119_pub.pdf/; accessed 03 Apr 2007. 
47 “International Monitoring Team to Arrive in Philippines This Week,” Relief Web, (Agence-France 
Presse, 04 Oct 2004), Sourced by Relief Web through its News Edge Insight on 10 Oct 2004; available from 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/b0de81bfd18481b8c1256f23003626ee/; accessed 11 
May 2006. 
48 Anthony Davis, “Rebels Without a Pause,” Asiaweek Magazine.Com; available from 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/98/0403/is1.html/; accessed 28 Feb 2007. 
49 Carolyn Arguillas, “Hot Seat: Al Haj Murad Ebrahim,” Philippine Facilitation Project; available from 
http://www.usip.org/philippines/newsbreak/hotseat.html/; accessed 28 Feb 2007. 
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Maududi50 model of an Islamic state where executive functions are exercised by 
the Chairman and the Jihad Executive Committee (JEC) or Central Committee 
(CC). Legislative functions are carried out by the Majlis-Al-Shura51 and the 
judicial functions by the Shariah52 court. Among the three sections, the Central 
Committee is the most directly responsible in managing the affairs of the Front. 
The MILF-CC controls nine standing committees; but the most active committees 
are those in charge of Military Affairs and Internal Affairs, both headed by Aleem 
Abdulaziz Mimbantas, the committee for Political Affairs under Ghazali Jaafar 
(aka Toks Abu), and the committee of Information and Propaganda Affairs led by 
Datukan Abas (aka Mohagher Iqbal).53  
In addition, the MILF has several provincial committees, supervised by the 
CC, that act as its local shadow government to facilitate zacat (extortion) 
collection and expand the MILF’s political influence in the local Muslim 
communities. These provincial committees are predominantly established in 
Muslim areas of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat 
where the Maranaos and the Maguindanaoans, both Muslim tribes, are the 
majority.54 The MILF provincial committees, where some have already created 
Shariah courts, have been established as part of the Front’s preparation for 
possible full governance of its claimed Bangsamoro ancestral domains, once a 
peace deal with the Philippine government is signed.55   
                                            
50 Abdul Maududi was one of the founding fathers of Islamic radicalism and a favorite author of Hashim 
Salamat. “Radical Islam and the Southern Philippines Secessionist Groups,” Armed Forces of the 
Philippines, 30 Sep 2004, 1.    
51 This is an Islamic traditional concept of consulting with learned and experienced citizens and elders. 
52 This is a law based on the Koran and the hadith, or the deeds and words of the prophet. “Radical 
Islam and the Southern Philippines Secessionist Groups”, 3 
53 Armed Forces of the Philippines Intelligence Estimate for 2006. 
54 Ariel R. Caculitan, "Negotiating Peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Southern 
Philippines," Thesis, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 29-30.  
55 Armed Forces of the Philippines Intelligence Estimate for 2006. 
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2. Strength and Disposition 
The MILF’s Islamization campaign has enabled it to influence and infiltrate 
a substantial number of barangays in Mindanao.  It is from those barangays that 
the MILF gets its members and supporters. Moreover, this campaign paved the 
way for the establishment of military bases in those affected areas. In 2005, the 
MILF was estimated to have 10,140 members with 8,170 firearms.56 The bulk of 
this strength belongs to the MILF’s military arm, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed 
Forces (BIAF), which has 14 Guerilla Base Commands (GBCs)57 largely 
dispersed in the provinces of Central Mindanao.   
3. Strategy 
The MILF’s political agenda is highlighted in the book, The Bangsamoro 
Mujahid by Salamat, which explains that the primary duty of the MILF is to 
“establish a just social order under the stewardship of leaders adhering to the 
Qur’an and the sunnah (the words and deeds of Mohammed.)”58 Salamat also 
maintains that the word of Allah must be made supreme by creating a true 
Muslim community; an institution with a genuine Islamic system of government; 
and the application of true Islamic way of life.59 He added that the means to 
achieve these objectives are through dawah (Islamic outreach)60 and jihad. “In 
2000, the MILF issued its Four-Point Program, which is aimed at Islamization and 
military build up for jihad, consisting of the following: 
• Diplomatic offensive to strengthen its ties with other countries and 
bring about a UN/OIC intervention through a referendum in Islamic 
communities that have been Islamized.  This is part of the MILF 
                                            
56 Armed Forces of the Philippines Intelligence Estimate for 2006.  
57 Ibid. 
58 “Radical Islam and the Southern Philippines Secessionist Groups”, 8. 
59 Ibid. 
60 International Crisis Group, 9. 
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strategy to use international pressure to force the Philippine 
government to accede to its separatist demands.  
• Massive mass action to show the Islamic world that the separatist 
aspiration of the MILF has mass support from the Bangsamoro 
people.  This program would include the Islamization of [Muslim] 
communities and the conversion of Christians and Lumads [native 
tribes in Mindanao other than Muslim] to Islam. 
• Peace negotiations for political concessions and military build-up.  
The peace negotiation is merely a strategy for the MILF to gain 
advantage over the government. 
• Launching of military offensives once the peace talks bog 
down.”61 
C. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP 
The Abu Sayyaf Group62 (ASG) remains the greatest threat to security in 
Southwestern Mindanao. The core members of the ASG are former MNLF,63 
who fought as Mujahideens in the Afghan-Soviet war.64 They were motivated by 
their exposure to extremist Islamic teachings which they learned from Al Qaeda 
training in Khost, Afghanistan during the 1980’s.65 When this core group returned 
to the Philippines, they organized the ASG as a group of Mujahideen Commando 
Freedom Fighters (MCFF) whose aim was to wage jihad against the GRP, in 
reaction to the atrocities that the ASG claimed the GRP committed against 
                                            
61 “Radical Islam and the Southern Philippines Secessionist Groups,” 9. 
62 The Abu Sayyaf Group, which means “Bearer of the Sword,” is the violent offshoot of MNLF. 
Eusaquito P. Manalo, "The Philippine Response To Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group,” Thesis, (Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 30. 
63 Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development 
to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism, (CA: RAND Corporation, 2003) cited in Kim Cragin and Sara Daly, The 
Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in Changing World, (CA: 
RAND Project Air Force, 2004), 77.   
64 Council on Foreign Relations, “Abu Sayyaf Group,” (Updated: 23 Jan 2007); available from 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9235/; accessed 28 Feb 2007. 
65 Larry Niksch, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation,” World Terrorism, 
ed. Edward Linden (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), 51. 
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Muslims in the Philippines.66 Under the leadership of the founding father of ASG, 
Abdurajak Janjalani, the political goal of the group was to establish an exclusive, 
independent Islamic and Theocratic State of Mindanao. Janjalani’s aggressive 
and intolerant religious beliefs also led the ASG to call for the deliberate and 
systematic targeting of all southern Filipino Christians.67 In 1994, Janjalani 
renamed the ASG the Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah (AHAI) in order to receive 
international funding and support.68 Likewise, the group established links with the 
Al-Qaeda and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which enabled them to maintain and 
increase their power over time.69 The ASG initially gained effectiveness as a 
terrorist organization capable of carrying out urban bombings with assistance 
from Al-Qaeda and JI. Eventually, the ASG ended up as a terrorist bandit 
organization that carried out sensational kidnap-for-ransom activities in the 
Philippines targeting several foreign nationals.70 Like the CPP/NPA, the ASG has 
been declared by the U.S. and the E.U. to be an international terrorist 
organization, along with Al-Qaeda and JI.71  
1. Organization and Leadership  
Abdurajak Janjalani combined the ideological fundamentalism of the ASG 
with cohesion, as well as political and moral causes72. His death in 1998 resulted 
in the ASG becoming a “very loose coalition of many groups of radical Muslim 
                                            
66 Banlaoi, 11. 
67 Peter Chalk, “Al Qaeda and Its Link to Terrorist Groups in Asia,” The New Terrorism: Anatomy, 
Trends and Counter Strategies, eds. Andrew Tan and Kumar Rama Krishna, (Singapore: Singapore Eastern 
University Press, 2002, 113. 
68 Banlaoi, 11. 
69 Niksch, 1-12. 
70 Jamail A. Kamlian, “Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines: A Discourse on Self 
Determination, Political Autonomy and Conflict Resolution,” A lecture presented at the Islam and Human 
Rights Fellow Lecture, organized by the Islam and Human Rights Project, (School of Law, Emory University, 
Atlanta, GA, 04 Nov 2003), 11; available from http://www.law.emory.edu/IHR/worddocs/jamail1.doc/; 
accessed 14 Feb 2006.  
71 Center for Defense Information, “Terrorism Project: List of Known Terrorist Organizations,” available 
from http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist-groups.cfm/; accessed on 14 Feb 2006. 
72 Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operation in 
Southeast Asia, (New York: Free Press, 2003), 109. 
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terrorist leaders commanding their own loyal followers in Southern Philippines.”73 
The death of Abdurajak resulted in a leadership change, bringing about the 
ascendancy of his younger brother, Khadafy Janjalani, as the next ASG leader. 
Despite the younger Janjalani’s attempts to revive the Islamist agenda of the 
ASG,74 he failed because he did not appear to have the same ideological zeal 
and leadership charisma as his older brother.75 Khadafy was seen only as a 
symbolic leader who could not exercise effective command and control over his 
subordinates.76 As a result, the ASG split into two major groups, namely, the 
Basilan-based faction under Khadafy, and the Sulu-based faction under Galib 
Andang (aka Commander Robot) who was captured, imprisoned and eventually 
killed on 16 Mar 2005, after a failed escape attempt.77 It is only on paper that the 
ASG has an Islamic Executive Council (IEC) under Khadafy Janjalani. Janjalani’s 
supporting advisers include Radullan Sahiron (aka Putol) and Isnilon Hapilon 
(aka Tuan).78 Supposedly, the IEC includes the following five functional staffs: 
Personnel/Operations, Logistics/Supply, Finance/Budget, Liaison and Medical.79  
However, these functions are not well organized on the ground due to loose 
organizational structure of the ASG. This created decentralized decision making 
by the ASG territorial leaders. Essentially, the splintered structure of the group 
deviates from the original secessionist and Islamic movement, and is in fact a 
mere bandit organization.80   
Khadafy Janjalani was confirmed killed in an encounter with Philippine 
military forces sometime in September 2006 on Jolo Island; while, his likely 
successor, Abu Sulaiman, was also killed by Philippine troops on January 
                                            
73 Banlaoi, 15. 
74 Banlaoi, 15. 
75 Ibid, 14. 
76 Armed Forces of the Philippines Intelligence Estimate for 2006.  
77 Banlaoi, 14. 
78 Armed Forces of the Philippines Intelligence Estimate for 2006. 
79 Ibid. 
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 21
2007.81 Due to these major losses in the ASG leadership, Radullan Sahiron has 
been designated as new leader of the ASG from January 2007; but, at the 
moment he has no clear vision for organizing the Abu Sayyaf’s operations.82 
2. Strength and Disposition 
From the ASG’s initial strength of 1,270 in year 2000, it has decreased to 
around 510 members with 420 firearms.83  Likewise, intelligence reports reveal 
that an undetermined number of ASG bandits fled to other areas, particularly in 
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanano, Sultan Kudarat and Tawi-tawi, in order to seek 
refuge from relatives and other Muslim armed groups based in those areas.  
3. Strategy 
As a result of the major setbacks in the ASG organization, it has no 
significant strategy at the moment other than its long-standing plans to conduct 
terrorist activities such as kidnapping and bombing operations far from its 
traditional areas of operations. In addition, the ASG is expected to intensify its 
build up of tactical alliances with other small Muslim secessionist groups and the 
MILF for support.84 
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III. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY 
A. THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT NISP 
Recognizing the resurgence of insurgent threats, the current president, 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, pronounced her government’s seriousness about 
eradicating the insurgencies, which are deeply rooted and multi-dimensional as 
illustrated in Figure 1 below. She promulgated Executive Order Number 21, 
Series 2001, known as the “National Internal Security Plan,” which serves as the 
government’s Strategy of Holistic Approach (SHA) in response to insurgency 
threats and the root causes of these problems.85  
 
   
Figure 1.   Representation of the Philippine Insurgency and the 
GRP Response (Source: From NISP, 8.) 
 
President Arroyo’s administration envisions creating a Strong Republic by 
means of a National Policy Goal which encompasses political and socio-
economic dimensions to address the root causes of the insurgent movements 
and to neutralize the insurgents that exploit these conditions.86 To attain this 
goal, the current government sets its political objectives as follows: (1) enhance 
                                            
85 Philippine insurgency problems stem from the core causes of poverty, ignorance, disease and 
injustice, and branches out and fuels discontent. Philippine National Internal Security Plan (NISP), 8. 
86 Ibid, 11. 
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good governance by fighting corruption and promoting transparency and public 
accountability; (2) accelerate programs to reduce poverty and promote respect 
for human rights and right to development; and (3) apply the left hand and right 
hand efforts to resolve insurgency with the help of improved intelligence efforts.87 
Figure 2 illustrates how the Philippine government foresees the development of 
its holistic strategy. For the current government, this paradigm reveals the 























































Figure 2.   Strategy Development (Source: From AFP Bantay-
Laya Briefing, 2005) 
 
The Government is optimistic that the NISP objectives can be fulfilled 
through a focused and skillful application of the pillars of national power 
(diplomatic/political, informational, socio-economic and psycho-social, and 
security).88 The imperatives of the NISP are: (1) to ensure a responsive and 
effective government demonstrating that it is a better choice than the insurgents’ 
organizations; (2) to ensure unity of efforts with the understanding that 
insurgency is the concern of the entire bureaucracy, non-governmental 
                                            
87 Philippine National Internal Security Plan (NISP), 8. 
88 Ibid, 11. 
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organizations (NGO’s), people's organizations (PO’s) and the entire citizenry; (3) 
to maximize the use of intelligence as a responsibility of all government agencies 
and as a critical pre-requisite to government response; (4) to manage violence 
and maintain law and order; and (5) to intensify public information campaign for a 
stronger link between the government and the people.89 Interagency 
collaboration is greatly emphasized in this strategy to ensure effective delivery of 
public services.90 Table 1 shows the responsibilities of different government 
agencies as regards to the above mentioned components of SHA: 
 
COMPONENT LEAD CONVENOR MEMBER AGENCIES 
Political DILG/LGU 





DSWD, DAR, DA, 
DBM, DepEd, DENR, 
DILG, DOF, DOLE, 
DOH, NEDA, PCFC, 




Security DND/AFP and DILG/PNP NSC 
Information OPS/PIA 
NAPC, DSWD, DND, 
OPAPP 
Table 1.   Government Agencies Responsible for SHA Components   
(Sources: After NISP, 47-52 and NAPC Organizational Structure.) 
 
The Philippine government promotes the operational methodology of 
Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop (C-H-C-D) in order to address this strategy, 
                                            
89 Philippine National Internal Security Plan (NISP), 8-10. 
90 Ibid, 17. 
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which defines the functions of different government agencies in addressing 
insurgency.91  The “Clear and Hold stages” are the responsibility of the DND-
AFP and the DILG-PNP. The “Clear stage” refers to the defeat of armed 
insurgents and the neutralization of insurgents’ politico-military infrastructures. 
The “Hold stage” is the occupation and control of the cleared and adjacent areas 
in order to protect the people and to secure the vital facilities and installations in 
the communities. On the other hand, the latter stages rely on the involvement of 
the civil government agencies. The “Consolidate stage” is the reestablishment of 
government control and authority while the “Develop stage” entails the significant 
reduction of the causes of insurgency.92 These stages can be conducted 
sequentially or simultaneously depending on the existing situation and specific 
phase of government response.93 Figure 3 illustrates this operational 
methodology. 
 
Figure 3.   Synchronizing the Agencies’ Efforts (Source: From 
NISP, 42.) 
                                            
91 Philippine National Internal Security Plan (NISP), 24. 
92 Ibid, 24-27. 
93 Ibid. 
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B. THE LEAD GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
The following GRP agencies are tasked with being the lead convenors in 
instituting, improvig and integrating the delivery of government services that 
address the insurgencies and their root causes.   
1. Cabinet Oversight Committee On Internal Security (COC-IS) 
 The Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COC-IS) is the 
overall coordinating and integrating body of the Government responsible for 
providing direction and guidance for the implementation of the NISP; it is also 
responsible for providing guidance towards the development of policies, plans, 
programs, and projects pertaining to  peace, order and security development. In 
addition, it is also tasked with encouraging and facilitating the participation of the 
different government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), local 
government units (LGUs), NGOs, POs, and civil society for the government’s 
peace advocacy programs. Finally, it also monitors and evaluates the outcome of 
NISP implementation.94 The COC-IS is headed by the Executive Secretary and 
vice-chaired by the Secretary of National Defense; its members are the different 
lead convenors for the implementation of NISP and the secretaries of other 
government agencies.95 
2. Department of National Defense (DND)/Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP)  
The Department of National Defense (DND) with the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines is the lead convenor for the NISP’s Security Component.96  The DND 
is the civilian oversight agency that supervises and provides policy guidance to 
the AFP in order to ensure a well coordinated and integrated security response 
against the insurgents.97 The AFP takes the lead role in directly confronting the 
                                            
94 Philippine National Internal Security Plan (NISP), 49. 
95 Ibid, 35-36. 
96 Ibid, 17. 
97 Ibid, 49. 
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insurgents’ army and provides advice to the DND and other agencies on matters 
related to security situation in the insurgent affected areas. To implement these 
roles, the DND-AFP formulated a strategy called “Oplan Bantay-Laya” (Defend 
the Freedom) in 2001 to defend local communities and protect the people.98 
“Bantay-Laya” closely resembles the previous government strategy of “Lambat-
Bitag.”99 However, “Bantay-Laya” is more encompassing as it addresses all the 
insurgent threat groups in the country. It clearly defines the military role by 
adopting an adjusted operational methodology of the Clear-Hold-Consolidate-
Develop (C-H-C-D) approach provided in the NISP. Instead of C-H-C-D phases, 
the DND-AFP applies Clear, Hold and Support (C-H-S) phases in the military 
strategy. This means that the AFP has cast itself only in the support role to other 
government agencies that implement consolidation and development programs, 
rather than being and not necessarily in charge of carrying out the development 
projects as it did during “Lambat-Bitag.”100 
3. Department of Interior and Local Government 
(DILG)/Philippine National Police (PNP)/Local Government 
Units (LGUs) 
In 2006, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), with 
the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Local Government Units (LGUs), 
was officially empowered by President Arroyo to partner with the DND-AFP in the 
fight against insurgency, pursuant to Presidential Order No. 546 dated 14 Jul 
2006.101 This executive order institutionalized further the involvement of DILG-
PNP-LGU in the counterinsurgency program as outlined in the NISP. In addition, 
the DILG is tasked as the lead convenor in the NISP’s Political Component.102 
This agency is responsible for coordinating and integrating political, legal and 
                                            
98 AFP Operations Briefing, “Bantay-Laya 2005.” 
99 See Chapter IV where the “Lambat-Bitag Campaign” is discussed in more details. 
100 “Bantay-Laya” 2005. 
101 DILG Memorandum No. 2006-154 dtd 15 Nov 2006, signed by Department of Interior and Local 
Government (DILG) Secretary and National Police Command (NAPOLCOM) Chairman Ronaldo V. Puno.  
102 Philippine National Internal Security Plan (NISP), 15. 
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diplomatic responses in insurgency affected areas. Likewise, it is responsible for 
orchestrating the full cooperation of the PNP and LGUs in the implementation of 
the NISP.103 The PNP, on the other hand, now has a more active role in the 
internal security concerns supporting the Armed Forces in suppressing 
insurgency and other serious threats to national security. Aside from being a 
direct partner of the AFP in conducting security offensives against the armed 
insurgents,104 the PNP is still responsible for the maintenance of the peace, 
order, and security of urban centers and vital government installations.105 Having 
these tasks assigned to it, the DILG is expected to be fully active not only in 
security offensives, but even more in pursuing political offensives to confront the 
insurgent parties and their mass movements. 
 In carrying out the provisions outlined in both Executive Order (EO) No. 
546 and the NISP, the DILG Secretary requires all local chief executives 
(Provincial Governors, Mayors, and Barangay Captains), DILG Regional 
Directors, and National Police Command (NAPOLCOM) Regional Directors 
across the country “to incorporate a counterinsurgency component in their 
integrated public safety plans.”106 The PNP is authorized to deputize the 
barangay tanods (village guards) and civilian volunteers as police auxiliaries or 
"force multipliers" under the peace and order plan, subject to the approval of the 
local peace and order councils.107 On the side of the local chief executives, E.O. 
546 has documented and formalized their roles to lead the fight against 
insurgencies in their respective localities.108  
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 Agencies that are expected to support the lead convenor in the Political 
Component are the DND-AFP, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department 
of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process 
(OPAPP), and the Office of the Presidential Adviser for Regional Development 
(OPARD). 
4. National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC)  
The National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) is a policy formulation 
agency that monitors implementation of the Government’s socio-economic and 
psychosocial strategies and programs and ensures a collaborative participation 
of concerned agencies and community organizations as potent partners. It also 
coordinates with national and local government bodies and private sectors the 
implementation of micro-financing and other development programs in order to 
alleviate poverty.109 This entity is chaired by none other than the President of the 
Philippines, which makes the presidency, the lead convenor for the NISP’s 
Socio-economic and Psychsocial Component.110  
In support of the NISP, the NAPC developed the “Kapit-Bisig Laban sa 
Kahirapan” (KALAHI) or (Linking Arms Against Poverty) as the national strategy 
for reducing poverty in the country.111 The KALAHI is the government’s 
comprehensive program for poverty reduction, which employs a strategy of 
convergence by bringing together the resources of the different national 
government agencies, civil society groups, legislators, local governments, 
business and private sectors. It is particularly implemented at the barangay level 
                                            
109 “Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan,” (NAPC Official Website); available from 
http://www.napc.gov.ph/kalahi.htm/; accessed 13 Apr 2007. 
110 “The Vow to Crush Poverty Within the Decade: The Chairperson Speaks,” NAPC Accomplishment 
Report 2001-2004, (NAPC Official Website), 3; available from 
http://www.napc.gov.ph/The%20Vow%20to%20Crush%20Poverty%20Within%20A%20Decade.pdf/; 
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in order to bring progress in the country’s poorest local communities.112 This 
strategy is a multi-level approach which has been propagated by the different 
agencies through their implementation of programs such as the following: 
• KALAHI-KALAYAAN (Freedom) is a joint effort of the DND, AFP, and the 
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), which aims to 
address the needs of the poor communities in conflict areas. So far this project 
has benefited a total of 600 barangays as of 2006.113  
• KALAHI-CIDSS (Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social 
Services) is spearheaded by the Department of Social Welfare and Development 
(DSWD)114 to empower the local communities in terms of governance. This 
project enhances the participation of barangays in decision making and promotes 
active involvement in designing, implementing and managing anti-poverty 
initiatives at their respective levels.115 Out of its objective to reach 5,378 
barangays in five years, the program had reached 3,759 barangays as of 12 July 
2006.116  
• KALAHI-Agrarian Reform Zone is a development program implemented 
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) that focuses on helping qualified 
beneficiaries “to acquire land, improve tenancy, enhance productivity, generate 
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income, provide physical infrastructure and micro-credit, and manage the 
environment, among others. It has a total of 9,130 barangay beneficiaries.”117  
• KALAHI-Poverty Free Zones is implemented by the Department of Labor 
and Employment (DOLE) to provide livelihood opportunities for the people in 
poor communities. As of July 2006 this project had benefited a total of 44 
barangays.118  
Figure 4 illustrates the organizational structure of the NAPC and the flow 
of its coordination efforts to alleviate poverty: 
 
Figure 4.   NAPC Organizational Structure119 
                                            
117 “Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan.” 
118 Ibid. 
119 “NAPC Organizational Structure,” (NAPC Official Website); available from 
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5. Office of the Press Secretary (OPS)/Philippine Information Agency 
(PIA) 
The Office of the Press Secretary (OPS), together with the Philippine 
Information Agency (PIA), is the lead convenor for the Information Component. 
The Executive Press Secretary who serves as the presidential spokesman is the 
OPS head. On the other hand, the PIA, which maintains regional, provincial, and 
municipal offices throughout the country, is the primary agency to deliver 
information nationwide regarding government peace efforts and development 
programs and projects.120 A Communications Group in the Office of the 
President is established under the provisions of Executive Order No. 511, dated 
06 Mar 2006 in order to rationalize, integrate and ensure close supervision of the 
public information functions of the executive branch. The Communications Group 
is also headed by the Press Secretary and its members are the PIA Director-
General and the Chairman of government mass media organizations.121 In 
support of the NISP, the OPS and PIA formulate and implement programs on 
public information and news to counter the propaganda of the LCM, SPSG and 
ASG at the national, sub-national and local levels. 
C. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT COIN STRATEGY  
Although the NISP’s operational methodology follows the C-H-C-D 
approach, it still maintains the concept of “left hand and right hand approach” to 
counterinsurgency, which is a combination of military operations and civilian 
agencies focused on socio-economic and psychosocial development. Taking into 
consideration all the concerns and objectives of the NISP as promoted by the 
present Philippine government administration, the author has developed a 
systemic structure using a causal loop diagram122 to illustrate how the NISP is 
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envisioned to have a successful Philippine counterinsurgency strategy. Figure 5 
provides an illustrative perspective of the NISP to shape up a more dynamic and 
multifaceted approach to insurgency. 
 
Military and Police 
COIN Roles





































Figure 5.   Systems Overview of the Philippine Government’s 
NISP to Achieve a Successful Counterinsurgency Strategy 
 
The above diagram shows that insurgency begins by instigating threats to 
the RP’s National Security. Eventually, insurgents increase pressure on the 
government to fight. In turn, this pressure increases the roles of the government’s 
security forces - military and police - since they are the most immediately 
available agencies that can be tapped for COIN campaign.  
If there is lack of proper education in carrying out COIN operations and the 
government oversight and monitoring mechanisms are not functioning as the 
security forces implement their efforts on the ground, there will be a greater 
tendency for security forces to abuse their power and commit human rights 
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violations. Such negative actions will intensify the outcry of insurgents and their 
sympathizers against the government’s injustice and abuses. This will eventually 
increase the dissatisfaction of the populace. After a while, due to insurgent 
recruitment and propaganda efforts among disgruntled individuals and groups, 
the insurgents will correspondingly increase in strength making it to be a 
reinforcing loop as illustrated by Figure 5.  
However, this can change to a balancing loop if the soldiers and police will 
be given appropriate and continuous reeducation and retraining to enhance their 
understanding of the causes of insurgencies. Certainly, such sort of education 
and training will make them more aware of and accountable for their actions in 
the public service. Moreover, this process must be coupled with proper sanctions 
for any violations. In this manner, they can be prevented from fostering injustice 
and perpetrating human rights abuses. Eventually, it will lead to a reduction of 
the people’s dissatisfactions with government actions.  
In addition, the government must increase its propaganda and must create 
and implement development services such as health, education and job 
opportunities all the way down to the barangay level, especially in insurgency-
affected communities. These policies will promote socio-economic and 
psychosocial development, allowing people to feel that a legitimate government 
is a better choice than insurgent organizations and propaganda. Although a 
threat to national security reduces opportunities for local and foreign investments, 
a balancing loop can still be achieved in favor of the Government through good 
governance. Good governance can be achieved by way of combating corruption, 
providing justice, and resolving the root causes of insurgency problem. If these 
efforts are sustained, insurgency escalation and resulting threat to national 
security will decrease and eventually die down.  
The holistic approach of the NISP towards accomplishing the imperatives 
of this strategy shows the seriousness of the Government’s counterinsurgency 
efforts. After reviewing the NISP, it is indeed in total agreement to the principles 
stated in Figure 5. The NISP can be described as not only focused on fighting the 
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armed insurgents and their organizations; but also as concerned with resolving 
the root causes of the insurgency problem. In short, its goals are to eradicate 
corruption and poverty, which are the two primary causes of the problem. 
However, it must always be acknowledged that the principal gauge for 
determining the plan’s effectiveness is its implementation. 
The current government recognizes and promotes good governance at the 
national, sub-national, and local levels by denouncing the corruption that has 
been creeping into several areas of the Philippine society and politics for many 
decades now.123 However, perceptions of leading officials’ insincerity and 
inaction in fighting corruption still exist124 because of unresolved corruption 
charges against officials in the civilian agencies125 and even in the military.126  
Regarding poverty reduction, 12,896 barangays are reported to have 
benefited from the programs of KALAHI as of July 2006.127 However, this 
number is only about 30% of the total number of barangays nationwide. 
Currently, the country has 17 regions, 81 provinces, 118 cities, 1,510 
municipalities, and 41, 995 barangays.128 It is clear that the effect of these anti-
poverty efforts has not been felt by the majority of the Filipino communities.  
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IV. HISTORICAL CASES OF PHILIPPINE 
COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS 
The successes and failures of the past administrations’ counterinsurgency 
(COIN) strategies show how each leader addressed insurgencies differently, 
despite having the same basic strategic approach: the “left hand and right hand 
approach.” This chapter reviews four case studies: (1) the "All Out Friendship or 
All Out Force" program of President Ramon Magsaysay; (2) “Oplan Katatagan” 
during the period under President Ferdinand E. Marcos; (3) “Lambat-Bitag 
Campaign” during the administrations of Presidents Corazon Aquino and Fidel V. 
Ramos; and (4) “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines” (OEF-P) in the 
current administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The objective for 
this chapter is to determine common trends, strengths and weaknesses of the 
mentioned case studies. 
A. THE "ALL OUT FRIENDSHIP OR ALL OUT FORCE" AGAINST THE 
HUK REBELLION 
According to Charles T. R. Bohannan, Ramon Magsaysay’s, "All Out 
Friendship or All Out Force" program against the Huk insurgents (aka “Hukbong 
Magpapalaya ng Bayan” or “People's Liberation Army”) is the best illustration of 
“stealing the enemy's thunder” because it provided them with an opportunity that 
was more appealing than subversion.129 Bohannan emphasizes that this 
approach required nearly the same energy, intelligence, resourcefulness, and 
dedication as a successful guerrilla movement. He also points out that it is 
greatly dependent on two successful traits; first, the behavior of the forces in 
contact with local civilians and, second, forceful and dynamic leadership.130 His 
argument suggests that a successful counterinsurgency is not primarily 
measured by the high technological capability of combat troops. Major Lawrence 
                                            
129 Charles T. R. Bohannan, "Antiguerrilla Operations," Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, (Vol. 341, Unconventional Warfare, May 1962), 19-29; available from 
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M. Greenberg explains in his historical accounts of the Huk insurrection that the 
Filipino soldiers developed the first of these successful traits on their own. This 
might be due to the fact that the Philippine military did not receive significant 
foreign aid, only surplus American World War II (WWII) stocks.131 The latter 
successful trait was embodied in Magsaysay’s support and close supervision. 
This became the primary factor that maintained the military's initiative and 
commitment to service.132 As a government administrator, he was viewed as 
especially dedicated because of his concern with “improving the quality of life for 
its citizens than with self-enrichment.”133  
Magsaysay's campaign against the Huk insurgents started when he was 
appointed Secretary of National Defense in September 1950, and he applied a 
two-pronged approach: the “right hand and left hand approach.”134 The “right 
hand” was an armed response; Magsaysay convinced President Elpidio Quirino’s 
administration to merge the police force (Philippine Constabulary) with the AFP 
and to engage in the reorganization and retraining of both.135 The “left hand” 
represented socio-economic development, which during that period was also 
administered by the military through the Economic Development Corps 
(EDCOR). The EDCOR project became the answer to counter the Huk slogan of 
"land for the landless" by engaging with a more publicized presentation than the 
Huk organization.136 Although the military had previously engaged in non-military 
ventures related to civic action and socio-economic development activities, 
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Carolina G. Hernandez notes that these endeavors still took place under civilian 
oversight institutions.137 The civilian agency of the Secretary of National Defense 
had been very active in monitoring the implementation of the program and in 
coordinating with other government agencies. This ensured that the stakeholders 
would stay focused on the objectives of the program. Colonel Ricardo C. Morales 
explains that the propaganda measures in this campaign were merely “icing on 
the cake,” because the beneficiaries represented only a fraction of the entire Huk 
movement. A large part of the campaign's success, according to Morales, laid 
both in the actions of a reformed military and Magsaysay’s dynamic 
leadership.138 As an administrator, “Magsaysay was equally fast to reward and to 
punish.”139 He was completely dedicated to support his strategy from the ground 
level up, even though it could have cost his life.140 Greenberg notes that 
Magsaysay remained simple in his appearance as well as in his dealings with the 
people. He did not mind walking to far-flung barangays just to ensure that his 
people would understand his intent and vision.141 If he found graft and corruption 
in his organization, he would immediately act against those involved.142 Although 
he knew that he was targeted for assassination by the Huks, he never stopped 
making unannounced visits to military installations and civilian communities. His 
attitude and actions ensured that the campaign was properly implemented. 
According to Edward Lansdale, all assassination attempts against Magsaysay 
failed because his leadership had an equally powerful effect on the insurgents 
themselves.143 In one instance, Magsaysay’s would-be assassin, Thomas 
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Santiago (aka Manila Boy) surrendered to him, after hearing about Magsaysay’s 
efforts from other people and talking to him personally.144  
Edward Lansdale, as Magsaysay’s U.S. adviser and close friend, ensured 
that U.S. support for this campaign went directly to the Department of National 
Defense. Magsaysay achieved three major successes in his years as Secretary 
of Defense; first, he transformed the corrupt and demoralized military into an 
organization with a sense of purpose and esprit de corps.145 Second, he seized 
documents bearing lists of Huk sympathizers and arrested en masse the 
Politburo of the Communist Party through information compiled by AFP 
intelligence.146 Third, he managed to use the military to ensure a relatively 
honest 1951 congressional election.147 David Joel Steinberg also recognizes that 
“the rise of Ramon Magsaysay altered the history of the Philippines.”148 
Magsaysay's popularity grew due to these achievements because people 
perceived him as honest and truthful, which was a critical aspect of successful 
COIN operations, and despite the fact that he was affiliated with the corrupt 
administration of President Quirino. Quirino was reluctant to support the 
campaign and contented himself with staying within the confines of Malacanang, 
the presidential palace.149 Eventually, Magsaysay's popularity led him to win the 
1953 presidential election. He also continued to support the program against 
insurgency that eventually led to the collapse of the Huk movement in 1955.150 In 
summary, the success of this campaign was due to a highly dedicated and 
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honest civilian administrator, who was given both the autonomy to implement his 
plan and the resources to support it. This success was coupled with the support 
of the reformed and reeducated armed forces, including the police force, that 
were perceived by the people as their protectors and not as their oppressors.  
B. OPLAN KATATAGAN (OPLAN STABILITY) 
 Despite the defeat of the Huk insurgents by Magsaysay's administration, 
after several subsequent administrations, inequality re-emerged in Philippine 
society.151 This paved the way for the resurgence of Communist idealism among 
young intellectuals. In 1968, the new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) 
was formed, led by Jose Maria Sison and others.152 A year later, the remnants of 
the former Huk movement joined the CPP and became the New People’s Army 
(NPA).153 Remembering the success of Magsaysay's campaign, succeeding 
administrations replicated its approach of a mixture of military and socio-
economic initiatives involving different government agencies. However, no 
administration was able to produce the same success as Magsaysay.154 Perhaps 
they lacked the vision and political will necessary for a successful COIN 
operation. Even President Ferdinand E. Marcos attempted to implement the 
same strategy before and immediately after the declaration of Martial Law in 
1972.155 However, he did not succeed either, largely due to the hunger for power 
and possessions of his family and close associates, which created disorder in the 
country.156 In order to secure the military’s support, Marcos expanded the military 
leaders’ role in the society, giving them the opportunity to amass great wealth. 
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This eventually led the military to become inefficient, corrupt and abusive.157 As 
Marcos and his “cronies” grew tremendously rich, others in the society grew less 
and less satisfied, allowing the Communist armed insurgents, the New People’s 
Army (NPA), to grow quickly.158 In addition, because secessionists perceived 
that Muslim areas were not given a fair share of allocated resources by the 
central government in Manila, the Muslim secessionist rebellion in Mindanao 
grew in number and strength.159    
The uncontrollable rise of insurgencies in the country led the Marcos 
administration in 1981 to formulate an integrated counterinsurgency program 
called "Operation Plan Katatagan" (Oplan Stability). According to Jose P. Magno, 
Jr. and A. James Gregor, this plan was strongly influenced by the U.S., and was 
based on the idea that the causes of the rebellions were rooted in political, social 
and economic problems.160 The plan involved the effort to unite the military and 
civilian agencies in a combined program of security and local development in 
order to address the critical safety and welfare needs of the population in 
operational areas.161 The main objective of this campaign was to win the “hearts 
and minds” of the people similar to the objectives of Magsaysay’s campaign; 
however, during its implementation, it failed miserably to defeat the insurgents. 
The Philippine population simply did not believe in the goals of the government's 
campaign.162 This was because the implementation of the campaign was not 
totally founded on the dedication and political will necessary to resolve the root 
causes of insurgencies; rather, it was based on manipulating the military and 
other government agencies so as to maintain the administration’s power. Marcos' 
strategy failed, despite the plan might have been similar to Magsaysay’s 
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campaign, because his administration was in a continuous grip of corruption and 
the Filipino people were under fear of military domination resulting from injustice 
and human rights violations. The success of COIN operations does not rely on 
the strength of any given plan as much as on the dedication and reliability of 
those who are charged with administrating and implementing them. 
C. THE LAMBAT-BITAG (DRAGNET) CAMPAIGN 
After twenty years of Marcos dictatorship, Philippine society experienced 
once more the rise of democracy as a result of Corazon Aquino’s inauguration as 
the freely elected President on February 25, 1986 and of her promotion of 
“national reconciliation with justice.”163 In April 1986, Aquino replaced “Oplan 
Katatagan” with “Oplan Mamamayan” (People) but it also failed to end 
Communist insurgency.164 This failure eventually provided the foundation for the 
issuance of a new strategy, the “Lambat-Bitag Campaign,” on 16 September 
1988.165  
The “Lambat Bitag” emphasized a heavy focus on the integration of civil-
military operations, intelligence, and combat operations and proposed the military 
tactics of clear, hold, consolidate, and develop.166 Basically, this methodology 
was derived from the "right hand and left hand approach,” wherein the objectives 
were to neutralize the growth of the insurgency and to achieve socio-economic 
development with the inclusion of civilian government agencies (CGAs) and Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs). One of the most effective parts of this 
campaign was the reform initiated in the military by reeducating its armed forces 
about human rights, values, and the importance of popular support in 
counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, this campaign introduced the 
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“Special Operations Team” (SOT) concept167 for dismantling the insurgents' 
political infrastructure in the barangays. Likewise, the employment of Civilian 
Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs)168 was implemented during this 
campaign in order to have auxiliary territorial forces that secured the cleared 
barangays while the military was pursuing the insurgents. By institutionalizing 
“Lambat-Bitag,” this campaign became a viable response against insurgents’ 
threats, particularly in the northern provinces of the country.169 This strategy was 
continued by the administration of President Fidel V. Ramos, which succeeded 
the Aquino presidency. President Ramos had direct knowledge about the 
campaign because he was President Aquino's Secretary of National Defense 
from 1988 to 1991.170 It was only during the implementation of “Lambat-Bitag” 
that a significant decline in the strength of Communist insurgents was noted.171 
However, the MILF and the ASG gradually increased during the 1990's,172 in part 
due to the “Lambat-Bitag” campaign’s primary focus on the Communist 
insurgents because ongoing peace talks between the GRP-MNLF and the GRP-
MILF were making progress.173 Additionally, the threat from the ASG only began 
to develop in late 1995.174 Intervening operation plans were crafted by the DND-
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AFP during the administration of President Ramos up to the election of President 
Joseph E. Estrada, including “Oplan Pagkalinga” (1996-1997), “Oplan 
Kaisaganaan” (1997-1998), “Oplan Makabayan” (1998-1999) and “Oplan 
Balangai” (1999-2001).175 These plans were built on the gains of “Lambat-Bitag” 
by establishing development programs in the cleared areas. In this case, after 
certain areas were declared free of insurgent threats, the DILG-PNP, together 
with the LGUs, would take responsibility on those areas and would focus on the 
implementation of consolidation and development programs.176  
Roy T. Devesa notes that as a result of these gains against the 
Communist insurgents, the Philippine national government and armed forces 
shifted their focus to military modernization programs for external security and to 
the problems of the MILF and ASG. The military efforts against the Communist 
insurgents were placed on a lower priority.177 These changes drew attention 
away from traditional military operations and developmental aspects which had 
been entrusted to the DILG-LGU as their primary responsibility; instead, the 
DILG-PNP took over the responsibility on internal security operations (ISO) from 
the DND-AFP in 1995.178 Devesa points out that these changes caused a major 
setback in the overall counterinsurgency campaign because the police force was 
neither totally prepared for nor educated to handle ISO responsibilities. They 
were not fully involved in the campaign because they were preoccupied with the 
challenges of drugs, kidnappings, and other types of organized crime.179 
Likewise, the Human Rights Committee points out that the “civilian counterparts, 
in most instances, fell short of fulfilling their corresponding tasks”180 on the 
development side. The national government made a hasty and poorly thought-
out transition because of the sudden shift of focus towards modernizing the AFP 
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and toward external security concerns despite the fact that there was no 
immediate external threat to be addressed.181 
This error in the government’s focus eventually caused the resurgence of 
Communist insurgency which was further enhanced by political instability during 
the regime of President Joseph E. Estrada. The drastic reduction of CAFGU 
strength (which created security vacuums in formerly cleared areas), the repeal 
of Republic Act 1700 or the Anti-Subversion Law, the reduction of the AFP 
budget, the termination of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) support, and the 
deterioration of socio-economic conditions brought about by the rising cost of 
living, unemployment, weak delivery of public services, and everyday hardships 
caused some people to lose trust and hope in the government.182 As for the 
CPP/NPA, they claimed that their Second Great Rectification Movement in 1992 
gave them their resurgence a resounding victory.183 The CPP/NPA affirmed that 
the resoluteness and militancy of their cadres and fighters for wide-range mass 
actions expanded their base, and built up their political work in terms of united 
front building and legal participation in politics.184 As a result of the Communist 
insurgents’ recovery, the responsibility for ISO was consequently returned to the 
AFP’s jurisdiction from 1998, where it remains up to the present. This campaign 
revealed that success in counterinsurgency would be hard to achieve without 
collaboration among different government agencies (military, police and civilian) 
from the national level down to the local level, COIN education, and dedication by 
civilian oversight organizations such as the DILG and DND.  
D. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States revitalized 
the alliance between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States (RP-
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US). President Arroyo was the first ASEAN head of state to offer the use of her 
nation’s air space and ports to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.185 
She also explained that the struggle against international terrorism drove her pro-
U.S. stand because it was linked with a national interest against insurgents’ 
terrorism within the Philippines.186 Since 2001, the United States has fully 
supported the Philippines in its counterterrorism efforts. Regional and local 
terrorist groups with ties to Al-Qaeda also pose a serious threat to the U.S., 
allies, and its interests in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Area of 
Responsibility (AOR).187  
Combating terrorism is now one of the main pillars of the bilateral 
relationship between the RP and the U.S.188 The two governments share this 
interest due to growing evidence of links between local terrorist organizations, 
particularly the ASG, and international terrorist organizations, such as the JI189. 
The U.S. government deploys troops to the southern Philippines for the purpose 
of joint military training exercises and advisory assistance; at the same time, the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) maintains full operational responsibility in 
its fight against terrorism within the country.190 In October 2001, the U.S. sent 
military observers to Mindanao to assess AFP operations against the ASG and to 
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examine AFP equipment needs. By late December 2001, AFP units on Mindanao 
began to receive U.S. military equipment. In January 2002, the U.S. deployed 
650 troops to the southern Philippines, particularly to Zamboanga and Basilan for 
training and advisory functions. This campaign was called Operation Enduring 
Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P).  
OEF-P was based on Balikatan191 (Shoulder to Shoulder) 02-1, a Joint 
Coalition Annual Training Exercise; eventually OEF-P would become known as 
the “Basilan Model.” In this exercise, the Philippine Government and the AFP 
took the lead role on all activities, while the U.S. military played the supporting 
role in terms of advisory, training assistance, and continuous civic action 
activities.192 This responsibility gave the GRP the opportunity to implement the 
COIN concept stated in the NISP at the provincial level. The legitimacy and 
credibility of the Philippine Government, in the eyes of the Basilan populace, 
were enhanced. OEF-P activities focused on increasing the security, 
humanitarian assistance, and civic action projects, which isolated the ASG from 
their local support networks. Soon enough, the government and the military were 
gaining active local support in terms of cooperation and information, paving the 
way the exposure of ASG lairs and the eventual reduction of their strength. LTC 
Gregory R. Wilson recognizes that this endeavor provided a framework for 
developing a holistic approach for effective counterinsurgency operations despite 
the fact that ASG, as an organization, were not totally destroyed.193 Although the 
entire operation was just a micro element of the macro campaign against 
insurgencies nationwide, this activity served as a strong model based on the "left 
hand and right hand approach.” The most positive aspect of this local 
counterinsurgency campaign was the collaboration among the GRP agencies, 
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particularly the DND-AFP, the DILG-PNP, and the local government of Basilan 
along with the assistance of the U.S Government, particularly USPACOM and 
the U.S. Agency for Internal Development (USAID), as well as different NGOs. 
They invested heavily in education, local economies, public works and social 
welfare programs as a means of weaning the population away from the 
insurgency, while the AFP conducted military operations to hunt down armed 
insurgents. This holistic approach to counterinsurgency created an environment 
of peace and development on the island of Basilan.  
E. ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES  
The “three-legged stool” model of Arthur F. Lykke is an effective tool for 
analyzing the means, ways, and ends that were adopted in the above case 
studies. Table 2 illustrates how this model fits into the analysis of the campaigns 
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Out of the four cases cited, three campaigns, namely: the “All Out 
Friendship or All Out Force,” “Oplan Katatagan,” and the “Lambat-Bitag 
Campaign,” had similarities in their means of addressing insurgency; foreign 
military support from the U.S., in exchange for the presence of U.S. military 
bases in the Philippines, which became part of the resources that sustained AFP 
operations. However, U.S. support ended in the early 1990’s with the pull out of 
its bases.194 Because of the pull out, the “Lambat-Bitag” campaign required the 
support of civilian government agencies such as the DILG, LGU and PNP to form 
part of the backbone for the consolidation and development phases.  
It should be noted that the U.S. had no direct oversight responsibility 
during the stint of the first three campaigns and so could not verify how its 
support was used by the GRP. Instead, the utilization of the resources during 
these first three campaigns depended much on the seriousness and dedication 
of the Philippine leadership and government to overcome insurgency problems. 
In contrast, during OEF-P, when U.S. military support for Philippine 
counterterrorism was revived in the name of the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT),195 the U.S. government did have the means of verifying how its support 
was utilized by the GRP. Due to the presence of U.S. personnel assisting the 
AFP on the ground, there was international pressure, on the part of the national 
government, including the local government of Basilan and the AFP, to make 
positive responses in performing their tasks and accomplishing their projects. 
This pressure was further enhanced by the participation of the USAID and other 
NGO’s on the ground.  
All the four campaigns recognized that the problem of Philippine 
insurgency is deeply rooted in poverty, ignorance, disease, and injustice. Hence, 
every government administration decided to use a variation of the concept of “left 
hand and right hand approach” in order to address both the insurgencies’ armed 
organizations and their root causes. The ways adopted in the “All Out Friendship 
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or All Out Force” program, the “Lambat-Bitag Campaign,” and “Operation 
Enduring Freedom-Philippines” (OEF-P) focused on reeducation and retraining of 
the security forces. This enhancement process gave them a better understanding 
of the problem and proper preparation for addressing the challenges brought 
about by situations on the ground that were not strictly combat-oriented. In the 
same manner, it can be observed from these three campaigns that with the 
active participation of the civilian oversight agencies and civilian administrators 
other than the AFP leadership, the campaigns ended positively. For “All Out 
Friendship or All Out Force,” the DND under Ramon Magsaysay was the primary 
civilian agency that monitored and coordinated both military and civilian 
concerns. Eventually, it also included the Office of the Philippine President when 
Magsaysay was elected to the presidency in 1954. For “Lambat-Bitag,” 
responsibility for oversight lay with the Office of President Corazon Aquino and 
the DND under Fidel V. Ramos up to the early years of his term as elected 
president in 1992; however, this close supervision and support eventually died 
down when the responsibility for counterinsurgency was turned over to DILG-
PNP-LGU as a result of lack of appreciation for the campaign. For OEF-P, the 
Office of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, together with her Cabinet Oversight 
Committee for Internal Security, became the focal agencies to ensure 
collaboration between military and civilian entities in Basilan; a great deal of 
credited is also due to the pressure brought by the close monitoring of the U.S.  
In contrast, it is important to note that in the Marcos administration’s 
campaign of “Oplan Katatagan,” civilian oversight monitor was glaringly absent 
because the administration relied too much on a military leadership that was 
engulfed with corruption. Neither was there massive reeducation nor retraining 
conducted for the soldiers on the ground to understand the concept of the 
campaign. The national government was not perceived by the people as serious 
and dedicated to alleviate their sufferings or to stop the corruption in the rank and 
file of the government; hence, despite the fact that “Oplan Katatagan” was a 
comprehensive counterinsurgency plan, its implementation was deeply flawed.    
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Although Magsaysay primarily used the military forces as his main tool for 
implementing his campaign against the Huks, he enabled the AFP by closely 
supervising the reeducation and retraining of the military entities, including the 
AFP’s reorganization by integrating the police force in 1950. Magsaysay himself 
served as the primary link between the armed forces and the different civilian 
government entities that could help the military. Likewise, the military became 
self sustaining in its socio-economic and psychosocial projects through EDCOR. 
Even though Magsaysay received meager resources from the national 
government as Secretary of Defense, he was entrusted by the Philippine 
government and the U.S. with managing the use of U.S. support which he 
intelligently and honestly used for his campaign.  
Like Magsaysay, Aquino and Ramos used the military as the primary 
means of implementing the “Lambat-Bitag Campaign.” Their administrations also 
gave emphasis to reeducating the AFP, particularly the Philippine Army (PA), in 
the concept of SOT in order to understand both the goals of the Communist 
insurgents and the objectives of the government. As a result, the Army was 
successful in relating and explaining to the Filipino people, through community 
dialogues, that what they were fighting for was for the benefit of the people. 
However, the police force was not included in these military reeducation and 
retraining programs for counterinsurgency. Instead, this was brought by the 
reorganization of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in early 1990’s, by 
detaching the Philippine Constabulary (PC) from the AFP and merging it into the 
Integrated National Police (INP) under a different civilian government 
department, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). A negative 
view of the personnel of DILG, PNP, and local government agencies working on 
the ground flourished because these civilian entities perceived that “Lambat-
Bitag” was just a military counterinsurgency campaign. Their lack of involvement 
during the initial stage of the preparations resulted in a failure to sustain the initial 
gains achieved by the military during the clear-and-hold stages of the campaign. 
Civilian agencies were not able to uphold the campaign’s consolidation and 
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development stages for a lack of understanding and appreciation of the military 
efforts. In addition, this failure was aggravated by an early celebration of victory 
against the Communist insurgents and a sudden shift of focus on AFP 
modernization for external security measures. As a consequence, those mistakes 
clearly resulted in the resurgence of Communist threats nationwide.  
OEF-P required a more complex organization of different stakeholders, 
specifically, the AFP with direct U.S. military logistics and training support and 
the participation of NGOs, USAID, and LGU of Basilan. In this case, the factor 
that led to success was the international oversight that put pressure on the 
Philippine government to establish close civilian oversight and monitoring in 
order to ensure collaborative implementation. Similar to previous campaigns, 
reeducation and retraining of AFP personnel was given emphasis, but this time 
the civilian agencies were also included during the preparation stage. This was 
brought about by the lessons learned in “Lambat-Bitag” and by the pressure of 
international stakeholder participation. The procedures carried out to make the 
concept effective were not greatly different from the concepts of Magsaysay or 
“Lambat-Bitag.” The campaign in Basilan made it clear that the success of any 
strategy depends on the coordinated and collaborative efforts of military and 
civilian organizations. OEF-P is considered a victory because it has reduced 
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V. COMPARISON OF THE ANALYSES OF CASE STUDIES 
AND CURRENT COIN STRATEGY 
From the case studies, the first clear lesson is that to have a successful 
counterinsurgency (COIN), a government must first have a comprehensive COIN 
campaign; there must also be a dedicated and honest civilian administrator who 
provides civilian oversight and monitoring. In addition, this administrator must 
have the resources and power to implement the plan, and be willing to go out of 
the four walls of his office to ensure that his directives are properly implemented 
on the ground and not just rely on reports. Lastly, he must not be concerned 
about facing sacrifices and while being firm about avoiding self-enrichment by not 
falling into the grip of corruption. Another important lesson is that the government 
must have motivated and educated armed forces (military and police) that will 
protect the community without encouraging oppression. In addition, government 
must also have dedicated civilian agencies that will take charge of the socio-
economic and psychosocial development of the people. These government 
entities (military, police and civilian agencies) must additionally be sure to 
perform their tasks collaboratively. These factors are the ones proven important 
during the implementation of Magsaysay’s campaign and OEF-P. These are the 
factors neglected during “Oplan Katatagan” of Marcos administration and the 
factors not sustained in “Lambat-Bitag Campaign.” These are the same factors 
needed to be sustained to make the NISP a working strategy (as presented in 
Figure 5, Chapter III) in order to shape up a more dynamic and multifaceted 
approach to insurgency. If international support is available, foreign sponsors 
must have a means of checking and monitoring the expenditure or utilization of 
their aid in order to put pressure on government administrators and implementors 
to ensure that the support will be used according to plan.  
There is no doubt that from among the four campaigns mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Magsaysay’s “All Out Friendship or All Out Force” program is 
the best illustration of a successful Philippine COIN strategy. This campaign met 
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all the criteria of a successful COIN strategy presented in the above paragraph. 
As David Galula cites, common grievances against the government serve as an 
effective motivator and attractive cause for gaining more supporters and 
members for the insurgents.196 As a result of Magsaysay’s campaign, the Huk 
insurgency died a natural death because the government resolved the root 
causes of grievances being exploited by insurgents. However, with the 
successive Philippine administrations, the insurgency rose up from its tomb 
because the roots of the problem intensified once again. Steinberg points out that 
the administrations of President Carlos Garcia (1957-1961) and President 
Diosdado Macapagal (1961-1965) lacked the vision and political will to maintain 
the momentum that Magsaysay began.197 During their administrations, there was 
a growing sense of frustration with lawlessness, a propensity for violence, and a 
seeming drift in society to which they did not give much attention because they 
were incapable of going beyond their “class and time.”198 These grievances 
became even more intense during the 20-year Marcos regime and dictatorship. 
Social grievances brought about by corruption, injustice, human rights violations, 
and fear of military domination were the effective recruitment tools that increased 
the insurgents’ membership and support of the masses. 
The big picture of the Philippine COIN efforts from 1968 to 2005 is 
outlined in Figure 6. This illustration shows the periods of Philippine governance, 
from Marcos up to the early years of Arroyo, in relation to the insurgents’ 
behavior within the period of their respective administrations. This graph 
indicates that such an increase or decline in insurgents’ strength has a direct 
relationship to opportunities that insurgents acquire at certain periods of time. 
Such opportunities are taken advantage of by the insurgents based on how the 
Philippine administrations carried out their respective governance.  
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Figure 6.   Insurgents’ Behavior Over Time (BOT) in the 
Philippines (Source: After OJ3, GHQ, AFP, 2005) 
 
Historically, the Philippine insurgents’ outcry for revolution was based on 
“the context of persistent poverty and the concentration of economic and political 
power in the hands of a few.”199 Such conditions were further exacerbated when 
Marcos was re-elected into power and subsequently declared Martial Law in 
1972. This declaration affected the basic political and civil rights of the people. 
Marcos temporarily suspended the elections and disbanded the political parties. 
He abolished the bicameral Congress and, instead, enacted laws by Presidential 
Decree. He directed the restructuring of the local governments’ decentralization 
process in order to facilitate his control over them.200 Such changes meant that in 
order to get funds for a project, local officials needed the approval of the “Manila-
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based bureaucrats.”201 This worsened graft and corruption in the government, 
increased the disparity of wealth distribution, and intensified political, economic, 
and cultural oppressions. Marcos tyranny led to the massive increase of 
insurgents nationwide, as depicted in Figure 6, because the insurgents took the 
opportunity of agitating the people over these grievances.  
The “people power” movement led to Marcos’ overthrow in 1986, which 
once again paved the way for the “redemocratization” of the country under 
Corazon Aquino. She led the ratification of the 1987 Constitution as the new 
fundamental law of the land. This was done to eliminate the laws promulgated by 
Marcos that led to tyranny. She also spearheaded the enactment of a number of 
laws and policies, especially the Republic Act 7160 known as the Local 
Government Code (LGC) of 1991,202 which had many provisions for citizen 
participation. These laws empowered local government units (LGUs) to begin 
delivering “basic services” such as providing health care and building 
infrastructures like schools, clinics, and public roads.  Under this Code, the LGUs 
were able to create their own revenue sources at certain limits and could engage 
in international aid agreements. Under these terms, the president would exercise 
only “general supervision” to ensure the legality and appropriacy of the LGU’s 
actions. In the case that LGUs were found engaging in anomalous deals, the 
central government could suspend them.203 In addition, Aquino created the 
Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability (PCPEA) and the 
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to restore government 
integrity and public confidence.204 She also restored freedom of the press 
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throughout the country, allowing the media to write anything about the 
government or even its opponents.205  
Recognizing that insurgents still posed a serious threat to national security 
and nation-building, Aquino sought to end the problem through a combination of 
military actions and reconciliation programs,206 as outlined in the case study of 
“Lambat-Bitag” campaign. However, in spite of a noticeable decline in 
Communist insurgents, as shown in the graph, they continued to exist; 
meanwhile, the problem on MILF started to escalate. The insurgents were able to 
take advantage of the opportunity resulting from complaints of Aquino’s unfulfilled 
promises brought by bureaucratic inefficiency, an extended and fragmented 
government structure, and the proliferation of political appointees.207  
The administrations of Presidents Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph E. Estrada 
did not create major reforms in the civil service efforts; however, Ramos gave life 
to the concept and obtained the desired key results of Aquino’s public 
administration.208 Ramos further enhanced local governance and 
decentralization. He promoted the privatization of government-owned and 
government-controlled corporations209 which, during the Marcos regime, were 
riddled with corruption by government officials and military officers. Ramos also 
organized the National Unification Commission (NUC) whose members came 
from the legislative, executive and private sectors. This Commission 
implemented the reconciliation policy known as the National Program for 
Unification and Development (NPUD) which offered amnesty to Communist 
insurgents, Muslim secessionists, and even coup plotters.210 In line with these 
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efforts, the GRP repealed the Republic Act 1700 or Anti-Subversion Law, to 
show the government’s sincerity regarding reconciliation. This led to the 
acceptance of the Communist Party as a legal political party, allowing it to 
express its social and political goals through parliamentary means, instead of 
armed struggle.211 While carrying out these “left hand approaches,” the 
government still retained its “right hand approach” to deal with the insurgents 
who insisted on fighting the government in a violent way. Despite these intensive 
approaches to policy-building, the Ramos government gained little public 
confidence because the Philippine bureaucracy was still perceived as generally 
weak, uncommitted to reform, uncoordinated, corrupt, financially burdened and 
incapable of coping with the needs of development and reform.212 Although, it 
was during Ramos administration that the Communist insurgency reached the 
lowest point of its history (see Figure 6), the Communists, including the MILF and 
ASG, began to rise up again during the latter part of Ramos term because of his 
government’s  failure to sustain the last two stages of “Lambat-Bitag Campaign.” 
The insurgents found the same opportunities as they did during the Aquino 
administration, agitating the people and increasing their dissatisfactions with the 
government. 
This dissatisfaction became much worse during the short-lived presidency 
of Joseph E. Estrada. Although Estrada initially intended to continue the 
economic and peace programs of the Ramos administration,213 the public lost its 
confidence in Estrada when he himself was impeached for being implicated in 
corruption charges. Estrada was charged with accepting bribes from gambling 
operators from whom he allegedly acquired some four billion pesos ($80 million). 
He was also charged with skimming tobacco excise taxes and taking advantage 
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of government business deals.214 These complaints led to his ouster from office 
after widespread popular demonstration in 2001.215  
Then, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was appointed as the new President in 
order to restore the nation’s credibility.216 Her administration established a vision 
of creating a Strong Republic. Adhering to this vision, President Arroyo now 
advocates for a “National Policy Goal” of eliminating the root causes of 
insurgency by promoting good governance and denouncing corruption. Her 
NISP, being the national COIN strategy has been proven effective when the 
concept was applied in the OEF-P. The OEF-P proves that the NISP is no doubt 
a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach to insurgency problem. The NISP 
agrees with the principles first developed in Magsaysay’s “All Out Friendship or 
All Out Force” program. 
The COIN campaigns of Magsaysay and the OEF-P are both considered 
as success stories in the GRP’s fight against insurgency using the strategy of 
“left hand and right hand approach.” However, they differ in several aspects such 
as the extent of success, the roles that the U.S. performed, and the primary 
enablers in these campaigns. In Magsaysay’s campaign, it was basically the 
entire Luzon area217 that felt the impact of Huks downfall; the U.S. has no direct 
representation on ground to oversee implementation of the strategy, and it was 
proven that Magsaysay served as the primary enabler of the campaign’s 
success. On the contrary, OEF-P’s impact on the insurgency was largely felt in 
Basilan province alone rather than in the whole of Mindanao. The U.S. had direct 
representatives on ground, monitoring the COIN activities of the campaign and 
assisting the AFP in terms of training and civil affairs activities.  
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VI. CONCLUSION  
“Who is the primary enabler in the local campaign of COIN operations in 
the province of Basilan?” This question remains unanswered in the minds of the 
greater Filipino community. Epictetus E. Patalinghug comments that the 
monitoring mechanism of the Philippine government is biased by favoring foreign 
assisted projects. He further points out that locally funded projects are not 
accorded the same scrutiny and attention in terms of monitoring and fund 
usage.218 Scott Harrison asks, “Once the money and the Americans go, how far 
will the Philippines be able to keep up the community development [in southern 
Philippines]?”219 Considering the statements of Patalinghug and Harrison, can 
the GRP attain the same success as the Basilan model if there is no U.S. 
pressure or American presence during that counterinsurgency campaign? 
Possibly, the outcome will be similar to the “Lambat-Bitag Campaign,” where the 
initial success was not sustained because of unfulfilled promises, bureaucratic 
deficiencies, and lack of collaboration among concerned agencies. 
The Philippine government must examine these questions and confirm the 
sincerity and dedication of the administrators and implementors of the country’s 
COIN strategy. Although, the underlying roots of insurgencies in the country are 
poverty and corruption, the crucial missing link to make the strategy work 
effectively is the “correct attitude” of both administrators and implementors. The 
“correct attitude” implies sincerity and dedication to performance without 
hesitation or personal interest in undue advancement. An attitude of carrying out 
continuous public services despite taking risks, and often sacrificing one’s own 
self for the good of the people is necessary. It is also an attitude of not coddling 
the “crooks” in the government, but of imposing appropriate sanctions or 
                                            
218 Epictetus E. Patalinghug, “Globalization and State Capacity: The Philippines,” Philippine Institute 
for Development Studies, (Discussion Paper Series No. 2003-20, Dec 2003), 24; available from 
http://www3.pids.gov.ph/ris/dps/pidsdps0320.pdf; accessed 07 Apr 2007. 
219 Simon Montlake, “Where US Is Helping To Make Gains Against Terrorism,” Christian Science 
Monitor, (15 Feb 2007), 1. Scott Harrison is a security consultant and a former CIA officer. 
 64
punishments on them. Finally, it is an attitude of going beyond “class and time” 
exactly as Magsaysay did. If this kind of behavior is inculcated in every public 
servant, especially in leadership, there will be no need for foreign sponsors to put 
pressure on the Government to get the job done. This kind of attitude also 
provides a needed link for good governance. If the administrators’ and 
implementors’ attitude is the opposite of the one outlined above, the roots of 
insurgency will certainly escalate and insurgents will continue to exist and 
multiply. If government administrators and implementors possess the “correct 
attitude,” they can achieve a more consistent and effective counterinsurgency 
program.  
After considering the four historical cases of the Philippine COIN 
campaigns and the insurgents’ behavior overtime, it is clear that the 
effectiveness of any COIN campaign lies in the hands of those who carry it out 
with dedication and diligence. The Office of the Philippine President, with its 
principal government agencies, particularly the DND-AFP, the DILG-PNP, and 
the local government units, represents the key stakeholders in pursuit of the “left 
hand and right hand approach” for fighting insurgency. History tells us that if the 
government is focused on and dedicated to addressing the root causes of 
insurgencies and it has the initiative and commitment to monitor down to the 
ground level (as the Magsaysay administration did, for example), the 
implementing agencies will also perform properly. However, if the ruling 
administration is unconcerned, corrupt, and power-hungry and yet, has the full 
control of the resources needed for the campaign (as was the case with Marcos 
administration), the responsible agencies will not perform correctly. Instead, this 
will create unstructured consequences such as bureaucratic inefficiency and lack 
of coordination among different government agencies.  
The Filipino people do not simply expect the GRP to provide security and 
to deliver the "physical infrastructure" needed for socio-economic development. 
More importantly, they also expect the government to demonstrate "moral 
infrastructure" in terms of discipline, respect for human rights, and knowledge of 
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the people’s needs. These are the qualities that were emphasized in the re-
education of the military forces during the campaigns of Magsaysay and Aquino. 
These are also the factors neglected by the Marcos administration. OEF-P shows 
that successful counterinsurgency operation can be achieved and sustained if 
there is collaboration among different government agencies from the national 
level down to the local level. If this process can be replicated in all areas of the 
country, then the Philippines will have a holistic and effective response against 
insurgency nationwide. 
 The NISP, as the current government’s national strategy against 
insurgency, is both a viable plan and an effective tool for coordinated COIN 
operations. This plan has been proven effective in Basilan which represents a 
micro aspect of the macro problem of insurgency. However, the government has 
to work hard to replicate the same success in other provinces of the country. This 
strategy must be fully recognized and internalized not only by national leadership 
but also by all government workers down to barangay level through a program of 
nationwide education and dissemination. The experience and lessons learned 
from “Lambat-Bitag” about government bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of 
appreciation by more civilian agencies must not be repeated in the current NISP. 
The NISP can be effective only if the administrators and implementors have the 
willingness to go beyond their “class and time.” The support and full cooperation 
of NISP identified “lead convenors” and other agencies are needed to make this 
COIN strategy work effectively. This is also true if greed, “crab mentality,”220 and 
organizational differences are prevented from hampering the collaborative efforts 
from the national level down to the local level. 
 The GRP must ensure that NISP becomes a workable approach and not a 
“book shelf policy.” Likewise, it greatly requires close monitoring and supervision 
from all agency heads, not only the President, to ensure that the vision of the 
national government is properly implemented on the ground. Senior leadership 
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must learn to adapt, listen, assess, and allow the ground leaders to become 
more innovative at their level. Lastly, a closer collaborative relationship between 
the government administrators and the tactical leaders will increase the 
opportunities for success in implementing any COIN strategy.221   
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